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DEBILITATING ALEXANDER V. CHOATE:
"MEANINGFUL ACCESS" TO HEALTH CARE
FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Leslie Pickering Francis* & Anita Silvers**
INTRODUCTION
Since 1985, Alexander v. Choate1 has stood for the proposition
that financially-motivated limitations and cutbacks in state-pro-
vided health care services imposing significant negative impacts on
people with disabilities are very difficult to challenge successfully
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act")2 and,
for similar reasons, under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA").3 During the twenty years following the Choate de-
cision, acquiescence in this proposition has largely prevailed.4 This
discouraging picture, however, reads Choate far too expansively.
In this Article, we develop a strategy for addressing and, we hope
ultimately, circumscribing Choate's influence and debilitating its
effects.
Part I of this Article analyzes in detail the Court's decision in
Choate. Part II then establishes how a wide array of cases, both in
and out of the health care area, have explained the meaningful ac-
cess requirement under the ADA, which the Choate Court ana-
lyzed in terms of the equal opportunity to make use of or enjoy a
benefit or service. Part III suggests, in light of several examples,
that understanding meaningful access in terms of equality of op-
portunity may provide a blueprint for success despite Choate. Fi-
nally, this Article concludes that the meaningful access standard
should be understood in terms of fair equality of opportunity. This
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losophy, University of Utah; B.A., Wellesley College; Ph.D. in Philosophy, University
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1. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
2. 29 U.S.C.A § 701 (West 2008).
3. 42 U.S.C.A § 12101 (West 2008).
4. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA's Impact on Health Care
for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51 (2000).
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reading brings Choate in line with Congress's goal in passing the
ADA to provide equal opportunity for people with disabilities.5
1. ALEXANDER V. CHOATE
In 1980, Tennessee was facing the all-too-familiar story of a state
Medicaid program that was costing more than legislators wished to
pay for it.6 Tennessee therefore proposed a limit of fourteen hospi-
tal days per year for each Medicaid patient.7 Although this limit
would have affected all Medicaid recipients and thus was equal in
this formal sense, it would have had significant deleterious conse-
quences for a greater percentage of Medicaid recipients with disa-
bilities.8 The undisputed statistical evidence was that in the year
before the proposed limit, 27.4% of all users of hospital services
with disabilities who received Medicaid required more than four-
teen days of care, while only 7.8% of non-disabled users required
more than fourteen days of inpatient care-a three-fold differ-
ence. 9 Tennessee Medicaid recipients brought a class action suit
and challenged the limit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act's prohibition of discrimination against people with disabilities
in programs receiving federal funding.10 The proposed fourteen-
day limit was actually a reduction from an existing state limit of
twenty days per-year per-Medicaid recipient, and the challengers
also argued that any such flat limit violated section 504.11 As part
of their challenge, the plaintiffs proposed instead a per-episode-of-
illness limit, fashioned along the lines of good medical care, as a
distributive approach to reduce Tennessee Medicaid costs without
unduly burdening people with disabilities. 12
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice
Marshall, upheld the Tennessee plan to reduce Medicaid expendi-
tures.13 The decision, as we shall argue, both reaffirms the possibil-
ity that section 504 permits litigation challenging programs with
disparate impact on people with disabilities and reaches the conclu-
5. For this reading of the ADA, see generally AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS (Leslie P. Francis &
Anita Silvers eds., 2000).
6. Choate, 469 U.S. at 289.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 290.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 291.
13. Id. at 288, 309.
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sion that the Choate plaintiffs had not shown the type of disparate
impact that would allow their lawsuit to succeed. Subsequently,
commentators have paid less attention to the positive affirmation
the Court expressed in Choate.14
The Court began its analysis in Choate by rejecting outright the
idea that section 504 prohibits only intentional discrimination.15
Thoughtlessness, indifference, and "benign neglect" were, in the
view of the Court, critical causes of the wrongs against people with
disabilities that Congress had sought to remedy with section 504.16
Much of the conduct Congress sought to change with section 504-
architectural barriers, mal-designed systems of public transport,
and special educational and rehabilitation services-was not the
product of intentional discrimination but of patterns of failure to
see harms by effect as parallel to harms by design. 7 Thus, the
Court determined that patterns of exclusion, even if unintentional,
may violate section 504-holding open the door to disparate im-
pact litigation under section 504 in health care and in other
arenas. 18
The Court, however, also rejected the contention that section
504 was intended to reach every case of disparate impact on people
with disabilities in federally funded programs.' 9 Section 504 was
meant to be kept "within manageable bounds."20 And so the diffi-
culty for the Choate plaintiffs was that section 504 did not assure
equal results for the disabled and the non-disabled alike.2
To sketch the parameters of those "manageable bounds," the
Court turned to its previous decision in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis,22 which held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act did not require the college to compromise its program integrity
by admitting a student who was not otherwise qualified for admis-
sion.23 "Otherwise qualified" students must receive "reasonable
accommodations" to afford them "meaningful access," but addi-
tional modifications in programs were not required. 24 Applying
14. See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 4.
15. Choate, 469 U.S. at 292-93.
16. Id. at 295.
17. Id. at 297.
18. Id. at 293-94.
19. Id. at 299.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 306-07.
22. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
23. Id. at 414.
24. Choate, 469 U.S. at 301.
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this reasoning to the circumstances in Choate, the Court concluded
that the fourteen-day limit did not eliminate "meaningful access. "25
It is important to note that there is dissimilarity between Davis
and Choate that is not made explicit in the Court's reasoning here.
In Davis, the analysis was about whether the student in question
was otherwise qualified.2 6 The plaintiff in Davis was a hearing im-
paired student at the College who sought admission to its nursing
program. 2 7 The College refused her admission on the basis that she
could not safely participate in its clinical training program and
would not be able to practice as a registered nurse.28 Modifications
in the program to allow her to participate would prevent her from
achieving the program's learning objectives because she still would
not be qualified to practice as a nurse.29 In Choate, there was no
question about whether Tennessee Medicaid patients were "other-
wise qualified" to receive health care services; the issue was
whether, with the fourteen-day limit, they were provided meaning-
ful access to the services they were given.3° The challengers in
Choate, of course, argued that limiting people with disabilities to
fourteen days of hospitalization prevented them from having
"meaningful access" to health care.31
To the claim that the fourteen-day limit would not provide
meaningful access, the Court replied that both disabled and non-
disabled Medicaid recipients would receive fourteen days of care:
each, alike, had "meaningful" access to that benefit.32 Tennessee's
Medicaid, moreover, should not be regarded as providing adequate
health care, or even adequate health, but as providing a "package
of health care services," among which fourteen days of hospitaliza-
tion were included.33 The Court's reasoning here rested on a spe-
cific understanding of the benefit in question: Tennessee had
chosen to provide a limited benefit-fourteen hospital days-and
this benefit was available, in the same way, to both the disabled
and the non-disabled alike.34
25. Id. at 306-09.
26. Davis, 442 U.S. at 400.
27. Id. at 400.
28. Id. at 401-02.
29. Id. at 401.
30. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 303.
34. See id. at 302 ("The new [fourteen-day] limitation does not invoke criteria that
have a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped; the reduction, neutral on its
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To the claim that fourteen days-or indeed any across the
board-limit on hospital days fails to provide meaningful access
because it resulted in a state Medicaid plan that disparately af-
fected people with disabilities, the Court responded that in enact-
ing section 504, Congress had not intended substantial changes in
state Medicaid plans.35 Although Congress had intended changes
that would eliminate other barriers inherent in system design, the
Court found that barriers implicit in state-funded health plans were
not among them, stating that:
Congress did focus on several substantive areas-employment,
education, and the elimination of physical barriers to access-in
which it considered the societal and personal costs of refusals to
provide meaningful access to the handicapped to be particularly
high. But nothing in the pre- or post-1973 legislative discussion
of section 504 suggests that Congress desired to make major in-
roads on the States' longstanding discretion to choose the
proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on ser-
vices covered by state Medicaid.36
Section 504 was not a guarantor of equal health or even equal
access to health care; it was instead a prohibition on exclusion of
people with disabilities from health care provided to others.37
Congress's focus in the legislative history of section 504 on the ar-
eas of employment, education, and elimination of physical barriers
is understandably relevant to the purpose of the Rehabilitation
Act, which is to assist people with disabilities in qualifying for the
workforce. 38 The ADA, by contrast a civil rights act, is much
broader and more basic in purpose than legislation focused on re-
habilitation services.
The core of the Court's approach in Choate was that the four-
teen-day limit applied to the disabled and the non-disabled alike.39
There were no barriers to this benefit as everyone could use it.40
Therefore, everyone had "meaningful access" to the benefit pro-
vided, or so it might seem. There is, however, a gap in this reason-
ing. A fourteen-day hospital stay is "meaningful" for those whose
conditions can be adequately treated within a fourteen-day period.
face, does not distinguish ... on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait that the
handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting or less likely of having.").
35. Id. at 304.
36. Id. at 306-07.
37. Id. at 303-04.
38. Id. at 306-07.
39. Id. at 309.
40. Id.
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For those whose conditions require more, such as patients requir-
ing high-dose chemotherapy plus stem cell rescue, fourteen days of
hospitalization might as well be no benefit at all. Limiting hospital-
ization to fourteen days thus provides meaningful benefits to many,
but benefits that are not meaningful at all to others. The question
regarding people with disabilities, then, would be whether such
people are significantly more likely to receive a meaningless bene-
fit because of the limit than are people without disabilities. This
question presented a difficult issue for the plaintiffs in Choate.
At trial, the plaintiffs in Choate brought forth two types of evi-
dence in an attempt to show that the benefit received by people
with disabilities was "meaningless." One type of evidence was sta-
tistical and involved a disparity between the lengths of hospital
stays of people with and without disabilities, with a significantly
higher percentage of the former than of the latter requiring more
than fourteen days of hospitalization.4 The other type of evidence
was testimony from physicians that certain individual patients re-
quired more than fourteen hospital days for adequate treatment:
patients with Guillain-Barre syndrome,42 acute leukemia,43 or
chronic bronchitis, for example.44
Neither of these types of evidence, however, was particularly
convincing as to whether the facially-neutral fourteen-day limit ex-
cluded people with disabilities from a meaningful benefit. Over
seventy percent of people with disabilities requiring hospitalization
were discharged within stays of fewer than fourteen days4 5 and
there was no showing that those who were hospitalized for longer
than fourteen days could not have received important beneficial
treatment had the limit been shorter. The physicians testifying
about their individual patients who required longer stays did not
limit their analysis to patients with disabilities. The Choate plain-
tiffs, in short, did not argue convincingly that people with disabili-
ties were excluded from a meaningful benefit within the limit.
Thus, the Court was left with a record that suggested the plaintiffs
were making a more general challenge to funding limits that would
adversely affect care for all Medicaid recipients, rather than chal-
lenging the policy because people with disabilities were denied a
41. Joint Appendix at 189-95, Alexander v. Jennings, 467 U.S. 1248 (1984) (No.
83-727) (letter from William B. Shaw to Ben C. Crim).
42. Id. at 129 (deposition of George Montouris, M.D.)
43. Id. at 132 (deposition of Richard Stein, M.D.)
44. Id. at 140 (deposition of Joseph M. Stinson, M.D.).
45. Id. at 189-95 (letter from William B. Shaw to Ben C. Crim).
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meaningful benefit of the kind that was available to people without
disabilities.
Choate does not define "meaningful benefit." While it is clear
from the decision that "no benefit" would fail the "meaningful"
test and that equality of results is more than would be required, the
decision did not go beyond these sketchy boundaries.46 Instead,
Choate leaves open a space in which "meaningful access" can be
defined. Crystallizing a strategy for defining this space is, we argue
here, the critical step for plaintiffs to undertake in seeking to debil-
itate the effects of Choate.
II. UNDERSTANDING MEANINGFUL ACCESS AS EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY TO USE
Both before and after Choate, court decisions have explained
"meaningful access" in terms akin to the "equal opportunity" to
make use of or enjoy a benefit or service.4" Such a standard is far
from requiring maximal benefit or equality of results, but it is not a
negligible "any minimal access" standard either.48 These cases that
define "meaningful access" involve a wide spectrum of issues, rang-
ing from education, to transportation, to governmental facilities,
and to health care. They include a robust range of cases that read
Choate as requiring plaintiffs to show that people with disabilities
do not have an equal opportunity to use a benefit in the manner
the state has provided it. These cases thus suggest a strategy of
success for plaintiffs seeking to argue that access is not
"meaningful."
A. The Non-health Care Cases
The understanding of "meaningful access" has been litigated in
several areas of law outside of health care. We start with some of
the most illuminating analogies in areas outside of health care-
cases from education, transportation, and the use of public facili-
46. For an analysis of "meaningful access" that discerns a tripartite test of (1) no
particularly exclusionary effect, (2) facial neutrality, and (3) no inability to benefit
meaningfully, see Alexander Abbe, Comment, "Meaningful Access" to Health Care
and the Remedies Available to Medicaid Managed Care Recipients Under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (1999).
47. Abbe contends that "meaningful access" should be understood as "adequate
access." Id. at 1198. His argument is based solely on the goals of the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA as bringing people with disabilities into the mainstream of Ameri-
can life, and, because "adequate access" is undefined, risks confusion with equality of
results. Id.
48. Id. at 1188.
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ties-and then turn to the health care cases themselves. In these
other areas of law, courts have held that if public entities are re-
quired to provide services or choose to do so, they must provide
them in a manner that allows meaningful access to recipients with
disabilities. Put summarily, "meaningful access" requires access
that enables recipients of services to benefit from them in a reason-
able way-in a way comparable to the opportunities others have to
use them-but not access that is of the kind recipients desire, of
the kind that would be most beneficial to them, or even access that
meets a determined set of minimal standards. "Meaningful access"
is understood comparatively, and not in terms of the extent to
which the access satisfies the desires of the person with disabilities.
Even so, as we shall see, "meaningful access" in the sense of "equal
opportunity to benefit" may be very important for helping to un-
derstand the contemporary significance of Choate for access to
health care for people with disabilities.
1. Preliminary Complications
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence with respect to civil rights
statutes has introduced several complications into cases in this area
that are not relevant to the understanding of "meaningful access,"
but that must be addressed and then set aside at the outset of our
analysis in order to avoid confusion with the main subject of our
argument. First, the Court has distinguished "disparate treatment"
from "disparate impact" cases under statutes that provide for non-
discrimination in federally funded programs. The first such statute
was Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 which prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in feder-
ally funded programs or activities. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits
discrimination in federally funded programs;50 section 602 autho-
rizes regulations implementing section 601.51 The Supreme Court
has concluded that section 601 of Title VI prohibits intentional dis-
crimination only, and has (in sharply-worded dicta penned by Jus-
tice Scalia) suggested that the section 602 implementing
regulations prohibiting programs with disparate impact go beyond
what Congress authorized under Title VI.5 2 Although section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, 53 prohibiting discrimination on the basis
49. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2007).
51. Id. § 2000d-1.
52. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 288-89 (2001).
53. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2006).
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of disabilities in federally funded programs or activities, was in
some respects modeled on Title VI,54 section 504's prohibition ex-
tends to exclusions and benefits denials, as well as outright discrim-
ination. Litigation under section 504, therefore, can allege
"exclusions" or "denials" beyond what may now be the intentional
disparate treatment limitation imposed by the Court on section 601
of Title VI. This analysis of section 504 would also apply to Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act's requirement that state
and local governments not exclude people with disabilities from
participating in or benefiting from their programs, services, and ac-
tivities solely on the basis of disability.56
Second, the Court has held that private rights of action are lim-
ited in disparate impact cases. 57 Suits under Title VI alleging dispa-
rate impact may not be brought by private parties.58 Suits under
the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA alleging exclusion
from or denial of benefits, however, are not disparate impact suits,
although they do not allege intentional discrimination, either.
Courts have continued to permit private rights of action under
these statutes,59 and the Court has not ruled definitively on this
issue.
Finally, state (but not local governmental) sovereign immunity is
implicated in these cases as well. The Eleventh Amendment pro-
tects state sovereign immunity, but Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment limits this protection by giving Congress power to en-
force its provisions.6 ° The Court has understood this enforcement
54. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 590 n.4 (1999).
55. See, e.g., John D. Briggs, Safeguarding Equality for the Handicapped: Com-
pensatory Relief Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 1986 DUKE L.J. 197, 211
(1986) ("[Tlhe statutory scheme that Congress created acknowledges the modest role
that intent plays in discrimination against the handicapped.").
56. See Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 907 (6th
Cir. 2004) ("Title II does more then prohibit public entities from intentionally dis-
criminating against disabled individuals."); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261,
276-77 (2d Cir. 2003) ("A plaintiff can prevail either by a showing of 'discrimination'
or by showing 'deni[al of] the public benfits' of public services.") (citing 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12132 (West 2007)).
57. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285.
58. See, e.g., id.
59. See, e.g., City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d at 907 (concluding that "28 C.F.R.
§ 35.151 effectuates a mandate of Title II and is therefore enforceable through the
private cause of action available under the statute").
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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power somewhat narrowly,61 although the scope of its decisions in
this area remains contested.62
Although these questions-the disparate impact regulations
under Title VI, private rights of action, and the extent of abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity-are difficult ones for civil rights
litigants, they are not germane to our question here: the meaning
of "meaningful access." Understanding of "meaningful access" set
out by courts in cases that have foundered on these other
grounds-for example, cases that unsuccessfully claimed the avail-
ability of a private right of action-remain good law. We will use
some of these cases in the analysis to follow, disentangling courts'
understanding of "meaningful access" from their responses to
these other issues where they occur.
2. Meaningful Access to Education
With respect to meaningful access, an initial leading case was
Lau v. Nichols,63 an education case decided by the Supreme Court
in 1974, a full decade before Choate, and recognized by the Court
in Choate. In Lau, the plaintiffs were a class of 1800 non-English
speaking students of Chinese ancestry and the defendant was the
San Francisco Unified School District.64 The District received fed-
eral financial assistance and the suit was brought under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act.65 The plaintiffs alleged that San Francisco's
failure to do anything but instruct them in English violated Title
VI.66 Without urging a specific remedy on the District, the Court
suggested that the District "apply its expertise to the problem '67
because classroom experiences that were "in no way meaningful"
and "incomprehensible" made "a mockery of public education"
and were therefore in violation of Title VI's prohibition of discrim-
ination in federally funded programs. 68 Chinese-speaking students,
61. See generally Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
62. See generally Anita Silvers & Leslie P. Francis, A New Start on the Road Not
Taken: Driving with Lane to Head Off Disability-based Denials of Rights, 23 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 33 (2007).
63. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
64. Id. at 569-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2007).
66. Lau, 414 U.S. at 565-67.
67. Id. at 565.
68. Id. at 566. Lau has been questioned for assuming that § 601 of Title VI, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2007), permits disparate impact challenges to federally
funded programs, as well as for permitting private rights of action in such suits. Alex-
ander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Sandoval leaves open whether the regulations
implementing Title VI, authorized by Title VI § 602, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-1 (West
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sitting in class without any comprehension whatsoever, could not
gain from their education and thus lacked "meaningful access" to
it.
Lau was cited three times in Choate. The first reference to Lau
was in support of the claim that litigation under section 504 is not
limited to intentional discrimination, but may also include policies
with disparate impact on people with disabilities. 69 The second ref-
erence occurs in support of the claim that in some circumstances
special adjustments may be necessary to provide meaningful access
for people with disabilities; merely showing that a policy is neutral
with respect to recipients of the benefit will not suffice to show that
access is meaningful.70 The third and last reference to Lau in
Choate occurs when the Court concludes that budget cutbacks in
state Medicaid programs that differentially impact people with dis-
abilities are not the kind of exclusions that Congress meant to pro-
hibit by section 504.71 Lau was thus among the cases turned to by
the Court in Choate in recognizing the boundaries of section 504
disparate impact litigation; while not defining "meaningful access"
in Choate, the Court clearly left room for the "equal opportunity"
approach set out in Lau and developed in other cases both before
and after Choate.
Shortly after Lau and before Choate had been decided, the
Ninth Circuit entertained another "meaningful access" case, in
which Mexican-American and Yaqui Indian parents challenged an
Arizona school district's unwillingness to provide bicultural educa-
tion for their children.72 In Guadalupe Organization, parents
sought education that took into account their children's special ed-
ucational needs and that reflected, even minimally, the historical
and cultural contributions of their people. Because the remedial
English-language instruction provided was sufficient for the stu-
dents to benefit meaningfully from their education, the Guadalupe
2007), may extend to prohibit practices that have a disparate impact as a method of
enforcing § 601; however, as we have indicated, Justice Scalia has suggested that they
may not. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282. The Sandoval decision, however, does not ques-
tion the basic contention in Lau that "meaningless" access would violate the disparate
impact regulations.
69. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 n.10 (1985).
70. Id. at 301 n.21.
71. Id. at 307 n.32. Here, the Choate Court cites Lau to assume, for the sake of
argument, that federal agencies may prohibit certain disparate impacts to further the
purpose of § 504. Id.
72. Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir.
1978).
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Organization court held that Lau's requirement of meaningful ac-
cess was met.73
Lau and Guadalupe Organization alleged racial and national ori-
gin discrimination under Title VI. Other education cases have
been brought under the federal statutes providing for educational
opportunities for people with disabilities, the Education of All
Handicapped Children Act, and the subsequent Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. Still further education cases have been
litigated under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of
the ADA.
Perhaps the closest analogy to the situation of Chinese-language-
only speakers in an English-only classroom is that of American
Sign Language ("ASL") speaking people with hearing impairments
in a classroom without sign interpretation. The leading case apply-
ing Choate to this circumstance occurred in 1990.14 The University
of Alabama at Birmingham had decided not to provide the
"costly" assistance of sign interpretation to deaf students, but in-
stead to give the students information about how to apply for aid
to fund the services they require, thus leaving students who did not
qualify for aid on their own to pay for interpretive services by
themselves.75 The University contended that, under Choate, it was
not required to guarantee students equal results, but only to pro-
vide them with equal opportunity-an open door to the Univer-
sity.7 6 In the University's view, it had done that-even though
students with special hearing needs might find themselves paying
more to succeed at that opportunity.77 Rejecting this argument,
the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the facts here from those in
Choate by stating that the "lack of an auxiliary aid effectively de-
nies a handicapped student equal access to his or her opportunity
to learn."78 In Choate, by contrast, everyone had the opportunity
to benefit from the fourteen hospital days they were allotted. The
University of Alabama at Birmingham's policy left deaf students
with an open door, but not a door to opportunities to benefit from
education that were at all similar to the opportunities available to
those who were not hearing-impaired.
73. Id. at 1029.
74. United States v. Bd. of Trs. for the Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1990).
75. Id. at 745.
76. Id. at 748.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Recently, a California federal district court applied the "mean-
ingful access" standard with regard to educational programs at a
public college in a suit under Title II of the ADA.79 A deaf student
alleged that a public college had violated the ADA because of the
inadequacy of its interpretive services. The lawsuit survived a mo-
tion from the defendants for summary judgment, with the court
stating that the college must provide the student with "meaningful
access" and must make reasonable modifications to that end.80 As
"reasonableness" requires an individualized, fact-specific inquiry
about what auxiliary aids were necessary to afford the student an
equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the program, the court
determined that summary judgment was not appropriate in the
case.
81
A related problem to the student sitting in a classroom, unable
to access the medium of instruction, is that of parents unable to
participate in their children's school-initiated activities. In Roths-
child v. Grottenthaler, hearing impaired ASL-communicating par-
ents of children with normal hearing sued the school district for a
failure to provide sign language interpretation at school-initiated
activities such as parent-teacher conferences. 82 The district's view
was that the parents were not "otherwise qualified," because
schools are for children, not for their parents.83 The trial court dis-
agreed, and denied the district's motion to dismiss. 84
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's determination that
the Rothschilds were otherwise qualified for the services in ques-
tion: they were parents of enrolled children, concerned about their
children's education, and interested in meeting with teachers at
scheduled conference times.85 Failure to provide interpreters
meant that they could not participate in activities such as parent-
teacher conferences.86 On the other hand, citing Choate, the Sec-
ond Circuit also concluded that "meaningful access" required only
reasonable modifications, not fundamental alterations; and that a
decision to limit the requirement to provide sign-language inter-
pretation to school-initiated activities such as parent-teacher con-
79. Hayden v. Redwoods Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. C-05-01785, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 835, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007).
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id. at *30, *38.
82. 907 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1990).
83. Rothschild, 907 F.2d at 290.
84. Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 716 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
85. Rothschild, 907 F.2d at 292-94.
86. Id. at 292.
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ferences would be reasonable.87 On the other hand, a district is not
required to provide interpretation for parents attending extracur-
ricular activities-and, notably, the Second Circuit included gradu-
ation ceremonies in the "voluntary" activities not immediately
related to the children's academic progress and hence not requiring
interpretation provided by the district.8 8 The Second Circuit thus
tied the parents' meaningful benefit to their ability to help their
children receive an equal educational opportunity.
"Meaningful access" does not require, however, services suffi-
cient for full performance up to the person's level of ability. The
facts of Rowley serve as a contrast to the situation of deaf people
whose access to a communication activity is so minimal that they
cannot effectively participate. 89 Rowley involved the Education of
All Handicapped Children's Act requirement of a "free appropri-
ate public education" for all qualifying children. Amy Rowley was
a deaf student with excellent lip reading skills who performed
above grade level-but not to her full potential, because she un-
derstood less than half of what was said in the classroom, much less
than she would have been able to understand with the aid of sign
language interpretation.90 The school district's refusal to fund sign
language interpretation for Rowley was upheld by the Court, as the
services she was provided did allow Rowley "to benefit" from her
education, although they were insufficient to "maximize [her]
potential. '"91
In sum, these education cases suggest that a benefit is not
"meaningful" if students with disabilities do not have an opportu-
nity to make use of it that is roughly similar to that which is af-
forded other students. They need not succeed equally, but they
must have an equivalent opportunity to succeed, or the benefit is
not meaningful. An open door is not enough: the opportunities
provided must be fair in light of the opportunities provided to peo-
ple without disabilities.
3. Transportation and Other Access to the World
In perhaps the most influential academic writing about disability
law, Jacobus tenBroek defended the right of people with disabili-
87. Id. at 293.
88. Id.
89. See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
90. Id. at 185.
91. Id. at 189.
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ties "to live in the world. '92 Thus, it should come as no surprise
that a number of transportation cases have interpreted "meaning-
ful access" in terms of equality of opportunity to navigate or trav-
erse the world. Such initial cases involved people with mobility
impairments bringing suit against transportation systems that were
usable only by climbing bus or trolley steps.
In Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, a leading case
that pre-dates Choate, mobility impaired individuals sued Chi-
cago's transportation system, which the plaintiff's claimed was not
mobility accessible. 93 Their suit was brought under the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the Architectural Barriers Act, and also alleged a
cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu-
tion.94 The Seventh Circuit in Lloyd held that section 504 permits
a private right of action to enforce affirmative rights of people with
disabilities to services that are equally effective as those provided
to others.95 According to the court, public transportation systems'
failure to equip buses with wheelchair lifts was a failure of equality
of treatment.9
6
In developing its analysis, the Seventh Circuit relied on Lau's
understanding of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act as providing a
private right of action and clearly saw the rights conferred in the
Rehabilitation Act as paralleling those in Title VI.97 The court
quoted the federal Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare's proposed regulations drawing this parallel:
[T]he concept of equivalent as opposed to identical [] services []
acknowledges the fact that in order to meet the individual needs
of handicapped persons to the same extent that the correspond-
ing needs of non-handicapped persons are met, adjustments to
regular programs or the provision of different programs may
sometimes be necessary. For example, a welfare office that uses
the telephone for communicating with its clients must provide
alternative modes of communicating with its deaf clients. This
standard parallels the one established under title VI of Civil
92. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966).
93. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
94. Id. at 1278.
95. Id. at 1283 (quoting proposed regulation 49 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(ii) and citing
Lau).
96. Id. at 1284. However, not all courts have agreed with this position. See, e.g.,
Mich. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Coleman, 545 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
97. Lloyd, 548 F.2d at 1280 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 29,551 (July 16, 1976)).
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Rights Act of 1964 with respect to the provision of educational
services to students whose primary language is not English.98
Other courts reached similar conclusions, both before and after the
Choate decision. The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that pol-
icies designating certain routes as "inaccessible" and permitting
drivers' discretion not to use wheelchair lifts on these routes failed
to meet the standards of section 504.99
If services are effective in providing opportunity, however, trans-
portation agencies retain a great deal of discretion in design. Such
agencies may retrofit, provide paratransit, or provide mixed sys-
tems.100 They may also make choices about the designation of
"key" stations for accessibility purposes on subway or rail lines.101
Finally, they may make choices about how to allocate funds in the
effort to keep transit systems financially viable. 10 2
Many other public decisions that make it significantly more diffi-
cult for people with disabilities to have the benefit of the opportu-
nities afforded to others to enjoy public facilities have also been
successfully challenged as failures of "meaningful access."
Crowder v. Kitagawa, a case about Hawaii's quarantine of guide
dogs is a particularly good illustration. 0 3 The state of Hawaii is
rabies-free and would like to remain so. To that end, it requires all
carnivorous animals entering the state to be quarantined for 120
days in a special quarantine station.104 Under this requirement, all
guide dogs were sequestered, although Hawaii also provided apart-
ment or cottage accommodations for the 120-day period for dis-
abled persons seeking to bring their dogs into the state. 5 After a
ten-day observation period, Hawaii also permitted the dogs to train
with their owners and to leave the quarantine station for limited
98. Id. at 1284 n.20. For a discussion of the parallels between Lloyd and Lau, see
generally Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of Civil
Rights, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 7-30 (Alan Gartner & Tom
Joe eds., 1987).
99. Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2004).
100. Am. Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir.
1989) (en banc).
101. See, e.g., Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 03-CV-1577,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84730, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006).
102. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better N. Phila. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. CV 88-
1275, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10895, at *12, *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1990) (finding
SEPTA's policy of allocating more of its federal subsidy funding to regional rail serv-
ing the suburbs rather than to city transit serving the inner city not to be racial dis-
crimination under Title VI).
103. 81 F.3d 1480, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1482.
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periods under the observation of a quarantine officer, as long as
the dogs had no contact with other people or animals. 10 6 Visually
impaired people who relied on assistive animals brought suit under
Title II of the ADA, claiming that they were unable to make mean-
ingful use of state services while their guide dogs were
quarantined. 107
The state's argument was that the quarantine requirement was
not a public benefit, but was a public health requirement. 10 8 The
Ninth Circuit, citing Choate, concluded that Title II prohibits poli-
cies that can effectively deny people with disabilities the benefits of
state services. 109 Without their guide dogs, people with visual im-
pairments were unable to use public transportation, visit tourist at-
tractions, enjoy public parks, or navigate public buildings. 110
Therefore, the question for the district court to consider on remand
was whether the plaintiffs' proposed modifications were reasonable
in light of the legislature's public health purpose.1
A particularly noteworthy feature of Crowder is that it opens the
possibility that state policies of one type-here, quarantine restric-
tions on guide dogs-could be discriminatory because they operate
to deny people with disabilities meaningful access to public activi-
ties or services of another type-here, public buildings, tourist at-
tractions, and the like. In such cases, policies of one type are
problematic because of the impact on accessibility to state pro-
grams of a different type. An issue this Article explores below is
whether state Medicaid policies sometimes function to discriminate
in this way.
Like transportation, currency may be critical to the ability to
navigate in the world. In American Council of the Blind v. United
States, a case that is currently on appeal, the American Council of
the Blind has challenged the United States government's failure to
produce currency in a form that allows people with visual impair-
ments to distinguish readily among different denominations.1 1 2
The district court held that inability to distinguish denominations
without relying on the assistance of others was not "meaningful
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1483.
109. Id. at 1484.
110. Id. at 1485.
111. Id. at 1486.
112. Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006), on
appeal Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, No. 06-8003, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6680
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 27, 2007) (assigning the case to a merits panel).
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access." Reliance on others to identify denominations, the court
said, puts people with visual impairments "always at risk of being
cheated.""'3 While "equal results" are not required for "meaning-
ful access" to be satisfied, to require that a plaintiff prove no effec-
tive access at all in order to prevail is far too burdensome." 4
Instead, the question in determining if a plaintiff has made out a
valid discrimination claim is whether the ability to distinguish de-
nominations of currency independently is an important conduit of
access to the world, as required by the Rehabilitation Act.115 The
court concluded that it is, stating as follows:
Like deaf students who can have real access to a lecture only
with an interpreter or a real time transcript, blind or visually
impaired people cannot make effective use of American cur-
rency without help. There was a time when disabled people had
no choice but to ask for help-to rely on the "kindness of stran-
gers." It was thought to be their lot. Blind people had to ask
strangers to push elevator buttons for them. People in wheel-
chairs needed Boy Scouts to help them over curbs and up stairs.
We have evolved, however, and Congress has made our evolu-
tion official, by enacting the Rehabilitation Act, whose stated
purpose is "to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize
employment, economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclu-
sion and integration into society.""' 6
In reaching this conclusion, the district court distinguished the case
at hand on its facts from another "meaningful access" case, Jones v.
City of Monroe, where the plaintiff challenged the location of
downtown parking facilities.'17 In Jones, a plaintiff with multiple
sclerosis claimed that Monroe, Michigan's parking policies violated
Title II of the ADA by failing to provide her with a parking spot
adjacent to where she worked. 1 8 Monroe had a one-hour parking
lot adjacent to her building, but lots with long-term spaces were
two blocks away." 9 In affirming the denial of her request for a
preliminary injunction, and concluding that she did not have a rea-
sonable likelihood of success on the merits, the Sixth Circuit
opined that she did have the same opportunity to park downtown
113. Id. at 53.
114. Id. at 59.
115. Id.
116. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on United States v. Bd. of Trs.
for Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1990). See supra note 74 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this case.
117. See generally 341 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 475.
119. Id.
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that others did; there were disabled spots in the long term free
parking lots, as well as in the short term lot.120 Therefore, the court
found that in this latter case, the plaintiff could park in spots that
gave her effective opportunity, despite her disability, to access the
downtown world. What she did not have was parking of the exact
type she desired. 21
As the Jones dissent pointed out, however, this reasoning left
unexplored whether parking two blocks away gave to the disabled
plaintiffs the same opportunity given to people without mobility
impairments to access destinations of their choice.122 The dissent
compared Monroe's parking policy to a library's decision to shelve
some books high up, where people with disabilities could not reach
them, and then offer in defense the claim that they were simply
failing to provide people with disabilities access to the books of
their choice. 123 In a trenchant critique of the majority's reading of
Choate, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court would have
found Tennessee's fourteen-day limit in violation of the Rehabilita-
tion Act if it had operated to provide people with disabilities with a
service different in kind from that provided people without disabil-
ities.124 By providing parking too far away for her to use, the dis-
sent contended, Monroe had done precisely that.
In contrast, in American Council for the Blind, the court con-
cluded that the failure to design currency so that people with visual
impairments can distinguish denominations was more like the fail-
ure to provide any access to library books or parking than like the
failure to provide access to preferred volumes or parking spots.125
Architectural barriers have also been analyzed as a failure to
provide "meaningful access." For example, the city of Sandusky,
Ohio failed to install curb cuts during sidewalk and street renova-
tions. 126 The Sixth Circuit concluded that removal of such barriers
was an express mandate of Title II of the ADA's requirement that
people with disabilities be provided meaningful access to public
services.'27 The Kansas State Fair's failure to make restrooms
120. Id. at 480-81.
121. Id. at 479 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 969 U.S. 287 (1985)).
122. Id. at 485 (Cole, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2006).
126. Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir.
2004).
127. Id. Because the court concluded that the barriers violated an express statutory
mandate, the court determined that a private right of action would lie.
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wheelchair accessible and to restrict wheelchair users to inferior
seating locations was also found to be a violation of meaningful
access, even though the doors to the fairgrounds were fully open.
The court said that it did
not agree with Defendants that mere physical presence on the
fairgrounds-at least when coupled with being effectively
trapped in a handicapped section, unable to leave for food or to
use the restroom, unable to view the stage, and subjected to be-
ing climbed over, stepped on, and bumped into by other at-
tendees-amounts to anything other than a denial of the
benefits of the fair.128
As in the cases involving education, in sum, the cases involving
mobility and access to the world attempt to strike a balance be-
tween no access and ideal access in the effort to determine what
constitutes "meaningful access." The judgment is often a compara-
tive one: does the type of access offered the plaintiffs provide
them with a benefit that is fair in comparison to that received by
others or, in comparison to others, are the opportunities they have
so limited as to be exclusionary or are those to which they aspire so
rich as to be preferential?
B. Meaningful Access: Health Care Cases
A multitude of cases have considered "meaningful access" with
respect to health care. These cases have included services pro-
vided, such as home health, eligibility limits, access to facilities, and
facilities closures. Many of these "meaningful access" cases cite
Choate, doing so to conclude that the services provided have not
been meaningful. As with the "meaningful access" education and
mobility cases, many of the health care cases involve an implicit
comparison between the opportunities afforded people with disa-
bilities and the opportunities afforded people without disabilities.
In some cases, however, the failure to provide services was so sig-
nificant that the court concluded that no comparison was
necessary.
128. Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 857 (10th Cir. 2003) (permitting a
private right of action under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA).
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1. Services Provided: Home Health Care
Helen L. v. DiDario was a challenge to Pennsylvania's home
care program under Title II of the ADA. 129 Pennsylvania was sup-
posed to provide attendant care services to Medicaid patients in
their homes if they qualified. Plaintiffs were qualified but were
denied such benefits due to lack of funding; thus, the plaintiffs
were forced to live and receive care in nursing homes and were
therefore unable to live at home with their families or to have con-
tact with people in the community. 130 Pennsylvania argued that
this practice was not discriminatory under the Rehabilitation Act
of Title II of the ADA because attendant care services were pro-
vided only to people with disabilities. 131 In a decision presaging
Olmstead, 3 2 discussed below, the Third Circuit stated that the
ADA was "intended to insure that qualified individuals receive ser-
vices in a manner consistent with basic human dignity rather than a
manner which shunts them aside, hides, and ignores them."' 33 Re-
jecting Pennsylvania's argument that there could not be discrimina-
tion because the services were only provided to people with
disabilities, the Third Circuit determined that the relevant compari-
son was whether the state's program exemplified the "benign neg-
lect" and "unnecessary segregation" which the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA were meant to remedy.13 4 Citing Choate, the Third
Circuit stated explicitly that Choate does not limit federal remedies
for disability discrimination to cases of discriminatory intent.135
The Third Circuit's decision in Helen L. was cited favorably by
the Supreme Court in a decision a few years later, Olmstead v. L. C.
ex rel. Zimring. 136 In Olmstead, the Court held that the ADA re-
quires public services to be provided to otherwise qualified people
with disabilities in the least restrictive manner, unless doing so
would require a fundamental alteration of the state's program. 137
At least one other subsequent decision has followed Olmstead in
concluding that a failure to provide home health services was a vio-
129. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc denied, No. 94-1243, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3896 (3d Cir. Feb. 24, 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Pa. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare v.
Idell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
130. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 329.
131. Id. at 335.
132. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
133. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 335.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 527 U.S. at 596, 598 n.9.
137. Id. at 607.
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lation of the ADA, unless so doing would require a fundamental
alteration of the state's program. In Townsend v. Quasim, the state
of Washington provided both nursing home and community-based
services to categorically needy people with disabilities under a
Medicaid waiver.138 For medically-needy Medicaid recipients,
however, Washington provided nursing home services only.' 39
Townsend was a categorically needy Washington resident receiving
community-based services in an adult group home, until his income
rose to the extent that he only qualified for Medicaid as "medically
needy. ' 140 He challenged Washington's restriction of community-
based services for the medically needy under the Medicaid pro-
gram. 41 The district court granted summary judgment for the
state, on the basis that the distinction was a permissible allocation
of different types of benefits to the categorically needy and the
medically needy. 142 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision, applying Olmstead's reasoning that services must be pro-
vided in the most integrated community setting appropriate; the
court remanded for a determination of whether extending commu-
nity-based services to the medically needy would be a fundamental
alteration of the state program. 143
There is thus a parallel between Olmstead's requirement that
services be provided in the most integrated community setting ap-
propriate and Choate's discussion of meaningful access to services.
The Olmstead requirement applies Choate's acknowledgment of
"meaningful access" in pursuit of equality of opportunity: access to
services delivered in community settings rather than in institutions
is important because the community is the site and source of op-
portunity for non-disabled and for disabled people alike. People
excluded from the community by institutionalization lack access to
even the most ordinary forms of opportunity.
2. Medicaid Eligibility Limits
In Lovell v. Chandler,141 the state of Hawaii had operated a State
Health Insurance Program ("SHIP") health plan for people who
could not fulfill the stringent income (below 100% of the federal
poverty level) and asset limits ($2000) of Hawaii's fee-for-service
138. 328 F.3d 511, 514 (9th Cir. 2003).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 515.
143. Id. at 517.
144. 303 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Medicaid plan but who had incomes below 300% of federal pov-
erty levels. 4 5 Because of cost increases, Hawaii sought to replace
both the fee-for-service plan and the SHIP plan with a single man-
aged care plan ("QUEST") approved under a federal waiver. 14 6
All fee-for-service Medicaid plan participants were eligible for
QUEST, as were SHIP members who were not aged, blind, or dis-
abled. 147 Aged, blind, or disabled participants in the fee-for-ser-
vice plan would continue to be served by that plan14 8-but aged,
blind, and disabled recipients who were in the SHIP plan because
they did not meet the income and asset limits of the fee-for-service
plan would be left without coverage.149 Hawaii's rationale for the
exclusion was the fear that managed care plans would not partici-
pate in the new program if significant numbers of the aged, blind,
and disabled were included-out of concerns that these plan mem-
bers would be more expensive. 150 Hawaii argued that this choice
was not discrimination against people with disabilities, but a deci-
sion to impose financial criteria for plan eligibility. 15 1 In ruling that
Hawaii had violated the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that Hawaii had excluded people with
disabilities who could not meet the income and asset limits of the
original fee-for-service plan, while including people without disa-
bilities in the same plan. 52 Providing those who could qualify ac-
cess to the original fee-for-service plan was not sufficient to
provide "meaningful access" because it denied access to those who
could not qualify.15 3
3. Ability to Access Services
In Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg,154 plaintiffs were HIV-positive pa-
tients requiring home care services. New York City had consoli-
dated its efforts to assist HIV-positive patients to access benefits in
a single agency, the Division of AIDS Services and Income Sup-
port ("DASIS"). The district court concluded that DASIS proved
dysfunctional and failed to provide people with HIV meaningful
145. Id. at 1045.
146. See id.; see also A. Gardner & D. Neubauer, Hawaii's Health QUEST,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 300-303.
147. Gardner, supra note 146, at 302.
148. Id.
149. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1045.
150. Id. at 1046.
151. Id. at 1053.
152. Id. at 1053.
153. Id. at 1054.
154. 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003).
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access to benefits available to other similarly situated persons with-
out HIV.155 The district court did not, however, permit the defend-
ants to introduce comparative evidence showing that non-disabled
people had similar difficulties in accessing social services. The Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the comparative evidence was not nec-
essary; the plaintiffs had demonstrated that they had special needs
for the services DASIS was supposed to provide, but DASIS had
failed in so doing "as a practical matter."'15 6 The failure was so
significant that the comparative evidence was unnecessary.
157
Another district court decision has also followed Choate in ana-
lyzing a state health plan's failure to monitor office accessibility of
providers. 58 Pennsylvania had a mandatory managed care pro-
gram, and did not ensure that all providers were accessible; indeed,
all Pennsylvania required was that the managed care program pro-
vided participants with a directory indicating which providers
served patients with special needs.159 The court agreed with the
state that it did not need to assure that each and every provider
was accessible. 16° The court also determined, however, that merely
assuring that some providers were accessible was insufficient; citing
Choate, the court concluded that Pennsylvania had not provided
the kind of equality of opportunity to access facilities that the Re-
habilitation Act and the ADA demanded. 161 Instead, the court or-
dered Pennsylvania to make sure that every provider met federal
regulatory standards, including updating accessibility with new
construction or remodeling, making sure that offices with more
than fifteen employees are accessible, and referring patients to
providers who are accessible in other circumstances.1 62
Several cases have also concluded that meaningful access re-
quires sign language interpretation or other forms of accessible
communication methodologies. Such cases have dealt with the
question of access to sign language interpretation by deaf patients
or their surrogates who cannot communicate with providers. 6 3
155. Id. at 269.
156. Id. at 283 n.11.
157. Id.
158. Anderson v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
159. Id. at 459-60.
160. Id. at 463.
161. Id. at 465.
162. Id. at 463-64.
163. See generally Elizabeth Ellen Chilton, Ensuring Effective Communication:
The Duty of Health Care Providers to Supply Sign Language Interpreters for Deaf
Patients, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1996). Cases have also been brought under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act by non-English speaking patients, which is analogous to the
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These cases have been brought under the Rehabilitation Act and
Title II against public providers'64 and under Title III against pri-
vate providers.165 In Estate of Alcalde, the patient was hospitalized
with respiratory failure and was fully competent. She was unable
to communicate without sign language interpretation, and the law
suit alleged that no interpretation was provided for the eighty-nine
days of her hospitalization. 166 As a result, she was confused by
what was happening in her complex care, became depressed, and
was unable to participate in critical care decisions. She died of suf-
focation after a shunt was removed, allegedly without her permis-
sion.167 In concluding that, if the facts were as alleged, the
Rehabilitation Act had been violated, the court applied the follow-
ing standard: "The test is whether an interpreter was necessary to
provide the hearing-impaired individual with an equal opportunity
to benefit from the services provided by defendants to patients
who do not suffer from a hearing impairment. ' ' 168 Additionally,
programs must provide materials such as patient instructions that
are accessible in order to ensure that communication is effective.
169
4. Facility Closures
In Rodde v. Bonta, the plaintiffs challenged a decision by Los
Angeles County to close a rehabilitation center providing inpatient
and outpatient care to people with disabilities.17 0 The district court
granted a preliminary injunction that barred the county from carry-
ing out its plans without providing the plaintiffs with necessary ser-
vices elsewhere; the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal.'71 The
county had consolidated its services for people with certain severe
disabilities (such as ventilator dependency) at Rancho, but later
facts in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See generally Siddharth Khanijou,
Rebalancing Healthcare Inequities: Language Service Reimbursement May Ensure
Meanginful Access to Care for LEP Patients, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 885
(2006); Barbara Plantiko, Comment, Not-so-Equal Protection: Securing Individuals of
Limited English Proficiency with Meaningful Access to Medical Services, 32 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 239 (2002).
164. See, e.g., Estate of Alcalde v. Deacon Specialty Home Hosp., 133 F. Supp. 2d
702 (D. Md. 2001).
165. See, e.g., Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820 (D. Md.
1998) (patient); Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (surro-
gate); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
166. Estate of Alcalde, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
167. Id. at 706.
168. Id. at 707.
169. Anderson v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
170. Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2004).
171. Id. at 1000.
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proposed its closure as a means to save money. 172 In granting a
preliminary injunction, the district court concluded that Rancho
patients could not easily be served elsewhere and that the county
had made no transition plans to accommodate them. 73 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished Choate from the facts in Rodde on several
grounds. In Choate, there was no showing that conditions appear-
ing disproportionately among people with disabilities could not be
treated effectively within the fourteen days of hospitalization avail-
able to them.174 Moreover, the reductions in Choate applied across
the board, but the County planned to close a facility where it had
previously consolidated services for people with severe disabili-
ties-and to do so without clear alternative plans.175 On the other
hand, the requirement of "meaningful access" could be met, de-
spite decisions to close facilities, when similar services were availa-
ble elsewhere. 176
5. Access & Location of Facilities
In Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, the
challenge was to the denial of a special use permit to a mental
health treatment center seeking to purchase a larger building in a
new location. 177 The area was zoned commercial, but in a classifi-
cation that required a special use permit for health facilities.178
The permit was denied after significant protest from local re-
sidents, who were concerned about possible safety risks from pa-
tients at the facility (despite any evidence of such a risk at the
facility's then existing location), many of whom had been in the
corrections system at one point or another. 179  Interpreting
Choate's "meaningful access" discussion, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the Rehabilitation Act prohibited denial of equal ac-
172. Id. at 990-91.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 997.
175. Id.
176. See generally Wright v. Giuliana, 230 F.3d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
"[the disability statutes] require only that covered entities make 'reasonable ac-
comodations' to enable 'meaningful access' to such services as may be provided,
whether such services are adequate or not"); Cercpac v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 147
F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding a decision to close a disabled children's facility
despite the fact that the facility that its patients were referred to offered fewer ser-
vices because "the disability statutes do not guarantee any particular level of medical
care for disabled persons, nor [do they] assure maintenance of service previously
provided").
177. 465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006).
178. Id. at 741.
179. Id. at 744.
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cess on the basis of disability, with the "corollary" that the Act only
prohibited policies that bore more heavily on people with disabili-
ties because of their disability-but not policies that disadvantaged
everyone alike. 8 '
Thus, there is a range of health care cases that, like the education
and mobility access cases, interprets the Choate parameters to
mean that programs fail to provide "meaningful access" if the ways
in which they offer services do not afford opportunities to people
with disabilities that are roughly equal to opportunities provided to
people without disabilities. These cases are not, however, exhaus-
tive of the range of possibilities opened by an equal opportunity
understanding of Choate's discussion of meaningful access.
III. APPLYING MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO FURTHER
HEALTH CARE EXAMPLES
It is clear from Choate that even if state activities do not rise to
the level of intentional discrimination, they can be challenged suc-
cessfully under the Rehabilitation Act and Title 11.181 As subse-
quent litigation has established, these include cases involving
inaccessible facilities or services, locations or closures of service
providers, and eligibility limits. It is also clear from Choate that
challenges to funding cutbacks in public programs such as Medi-
caid will not succeed under these disability rights statutes if the
challenges allege nothing more than that the cutbacks are problem-
atic generally but may bear somewhat more heavily on people with
disabilities. Instead, successful strategies will need to show much
more: specifically, that a policy fails to provide people with disabil-
ities with equality of opportunity in comparison to the opportuni-
ties provided people without disabilities.
In this Part, we take on two of the areas where it would seem
that meaningful access challenges are the most difficult: service
limitations and funding limitations. These are the types of cases in
which the Choate Court's rejection of privileging disabled people in
resource distribution seems most problematic because the dispa-
rate impact of such limitations may result from disabilities that can-
not be reasonably accommodated-that is, require accommodation
that can be achieved only through undue expense or substantial
alteration of the programmatic purpose. Yet, we suggest in light of
several examples, that even here, understanding meaningful access
180. Id. at 748.
181. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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in terms of equality of opportunity may provide a blueprint for
success.
A. Service Limitations
In Choate, Tennessee limited services in order to cut costs: a
fourteen-day maximum of hospital days per year.18 2 This limit was
unfortunate for everyone in Tennessee who needed more than
fourteen days for successful treatment, and plaintiffs with disabili-
ties were unable to show that the impact on them was sufficiently
different to violate the Rehabilitation Act.18 3 Other service limita-
tions, however, might be shown to impose special disadvantages on
people with disabilities. Services for the chronically mentally ill are
one example; limitations on durable medical equipment are
another.
1. Services for the Chronically Mentally Ill
Some state health plans do not cover certain hospitalizations in a
mental health facility for some patients under state Medicaid plans;
Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Texas, for example, do not cover inpa-
tient psychiatric and substance abuse treatment. 184 Medicaid
serves a very high proportion of people with chronic mental ill-
ness.8 5 Arguably, failure to cover such services could be demon-
strated to affect people with disabilities in such unequal fashion as
to fail to provide them with meaningful access to mental health
services-since it is largely people with disabilities who would re-
quire such services."8 6
One case is suggestive of how this strategy might work. Under
the Medicaid Act, Katie A. v. L.A. County187might help to illustrate
this strategy in operation. In Katie A., the Ninth Circuit considered
whether California's refusal to provide wraparound mental health
services and therapeutic care to foster children was a failure to pro-
182. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985).
183. Id. at 308-09.
184. See Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid Benefits: Online Database, Benefits
by Service: Rehabilitation Services: Mental Health and Substance Abuse (October
2006), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/benefits/service.jsp?gr=off&nt=on&so=0&tg=0&
yr=3&cat=12&sv=36.
185. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank et al., Medicaid and Mental Health: Be Careful
What You Ask For, 22 HEALTH AFF. 101 (2003).
186. See, e.g., Robert Rosenheck et al., Improving Access to Disability Benefits
Among Homeless Persons With Mental Illness: An Agency-Specific Approach to Ser-
vices Integration, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 524 (1999).
187. 481 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007).
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vide meaningful access under the Medicaid program.18  Califor-
nia's contention was that it had made a choice about the method of
delivery of the medically necessary services. The district court con-
cluded that there was undisputed evidence that the services were
medically necessary and granted the preliminary injunction sought
by plaintiffs.' 89 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
district court had applied an erroneous standard of whether the
services had been meaningfully provided by assuming that they had
to be provided in an "unbundled manner."'190 The question for the
district court now on remand is whether the required services had
been provided in an effective manner-not whether they had been
provided as a separate type of service. 191 If "effective manner" is
understood in the comparative way we suggest, the question on re-
mand would then be whether the organization of service providing
to people with disabilities gave them the same opportunity to bene-
fit from the services that were available to others.
2. Durable Medical Equipment
Utah Medicaid funds some durable medical equipment, such as
medically necessary artificial limbs. 9 2 Wheelchairs are included
under Utah Medicaid. 193 Utah Medicaid does not, however, fund
wheelchairs for non-home use, nor does it fund repairs for home
wheelchairs that have been damaged in out-of-home use.1 94 Recip
ients of prosthetic limbs are not required to strip off their legs if
they want to attend to business beyond their front doors, nor are
recipients of casts and crutches made to stay home until their inju-
ries heal, but recipients of wheelchairs do not have the same op-
portunity to make use of their medical benefit to go out into the
world. Arguably, this policy fails to provide even a modicum of
equality of opportunity for people with mobility impairments who
are unable to be in the world without their wheelchairs. Yet, dura-
188. Although the plaintiffs also alleged claims under the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA, the case was decided only under the Medicaid Act. Id.
189. Id. at 1153.
190. Id. at 1162-63.
191. Id. at 1163.
192. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.414-70-7 (2007).
193. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.414-70-6 (2007).
194. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.414-70-9 (2007). Truth in disclosure: one of the au-
thors, Leslie P. Francis, is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Disability Law
Center in Utah. The Center appeared at administrative hearings in opposition to this
regulation.
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ble medical equipment of many other types is funded without such
home restriction.' 95
Moreover, this Utah policy might also be challenged for its im-
pact on other fundamental rights. Consider someone with a mobil-
ity impairment who needs a wheelchair to get to the polls, to attend
school, or even to get to the now-accessible courthouse after Ten-
nessee v. Lane.196 If ever there were a policy choice that adversely
affects what tenBroek calls the "right to live in the world, 1 97 this
policy regarding durable medical equipment would be the one.
B. Funding Limitations
A second type of case at the apparent heart of Choate is state
funding limits. Faced with rising health care costs, states have cut
reimbursement rates in Medicaid programs. There are serious con-
cerns that such cutbacks make it very difficult to entice providers
to serve Medicaid patients. If such funding limitations affected an
identifiable group of Medicaid patients with disabilities-for exam-
ple, chronic psychiatric patients' 98-such limitations might be chal-
lenged as failing to provide people with disabilities with meaningful
access to health care.
CONCLUSION
The problem with Choate having been cast as a case limiting the
ability of people with disabilities to challenge the disparate impact
of limits in state funding of health care is that it was really a case
challenging Medicaid cutbacks generally. Neither the ADA nor
the Rehabilitation Act prohibits states from being stingy. States
can, if they so choose, provide programs that fail to give any of
their citizens opportunity. They can refuse to participate in Medi-
caid. They can decide, if they do participate, only to provide ser-
195. In adopting its policy for durable medical equipment, Utah simply followed
the Medicare benefit available under home health, where the restriction to medical
equipment used in the home makes more sense. Personal communication from Rob
Denton, Utah Disability Law Center, to Leslie Pickering Francis (on file with author).
196. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). For a reading of Lane, see generally Anita Silvers &
Leslie Pickering Francis, A New Start on the Road Not Taken: Driving With Lane To
Head Off Disability-Based Denials of Rights, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 33 (2007).
197. See tenBroek, supra note 92.
198. See, e.g., Diane Rowland et al., Accomplishments and Challenges in Medicaid
Mental Health, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73, 80-82 (2003), available at http://content.health
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/22/5/73.pdf (explaining how states' efforts to contain Medicaid
costs may pose disproportionate risks to those with mental health needs).
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vices to the categorically needy-although they must, of course,
meet the standards of the Medicaid Act.199
What states cannot do, however, is decide to offer services and
then offer them in such a way that they do not provide equality of
opportunity to people with disabilities receiving those services, in
comparison to people without disabilities receiving the same ser-
vices. Equality of opportunity in this sense requires benefits of
roughly equal serviceability for disabled and non-disabled alike.
This is the possibility left open by Choate and developed in a range
of cases understanding "meaningful access" in terms of equality of
opportunity. It is a powerful possibility indeed for people with dis-
abilities seeking to challenge state-provided health care programs
on the grounds that they violate the Rehabilitation Act or Title II
of the ADA.
199. See, e.g., DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998).
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